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NONEMPLOYEE ACCESS TO EMPLOYER 
PROPERTY: A STATE OR FEDERAL SOLUTION?  
 
JEFFREY M. HIRSCH  
 
It has been five years since I wrote Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal 
Labor Law, in which I addressed some of the problems arising from the current limits 
on unions’ and other nonemployees’ ability to access employer property.1  Although 
my appreciation for the issues at stake in these cases has developed during that time, 
the law has largely remained static.  This has put me in somewhat of an odd position, 
as I find myself lamenting that my article still has relevance; I would much rather be 
looking back at a piece that reforms had made obsolete.  On the other hand, the lack 
of reform has provided me the opportunity to engage in this discussion with Jesse 
Dill. 
 In his article, Restoring Unions in America by Reforming Nonemployee Union 
Representative Access Rights to Employer Property, Dill also confronts the nonemployee 
access issue, but he takes a far different path.2  We do not differ in our view that the 
current Lechmere/Babcock framework inadequately protects nonemployees’ ability to 
communicate with employees on employer property.3  Yet, our approaches to reform 
are diametrically opposed: I criticize the influence of state property law in federal 
labor cases, while Dill seeks to increase the influence of state law.4 
 In distinguishing our approaches to right-to-access disputes, one must 
consider two separate realities.  The first, which was the focus of my article, is the 
status quo.  It is a world in which Lechmere remains the law, with no serious prospect 
                                                
 Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. 
1 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L. REV. 891 (2006) 
[hereinafter Property]. 
2 Jesse Dill, Restoring Unions in America by Reforming Nonemployee Union Representative Access Rights to 
Employer Property, 12 TRANSACTIONS:  TENN. J. OF BUS. L. 127 (2010). 
3 See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 
(1956).  
4 See Dill, supra note 2, at 131. 
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of congressional or judicial reversal.5  It was this reality with which my article was 
concerned—a reality where, in my mind, the National Labor Relations Board (the 
“NLRB”) still has options for improving nonemployees’ ability to communicate with 
employees at a worksite despite the limits of Lechmere.6  Dill raises objections to this 
argument, but his ultimate focus is on an entirely different reality.  This reality is one 
in which the Supreme Court or Congress takes up reform.7  This kind of reform is 
not likely in the near future, but it is certainly worth considering.  Indeed, I share 
Dill’s desire for a more substantive solution to Lechmere by the Supreme Court or 
Congress.  My belief that reform would not happen anytime soon led me to my 
original argument, but I am more than happy to engage in a more optimistic exercise 
and consider how such reform should occur.   
 Beyond this discussion on reforming nonemployee access rights is a far 
broader debate.  A central feature of Dill’s and my differing approaches to 
nonemployee access disputes are disparate views of a much larger issue: workplace 
federalism.  The extent to which labor and employment law should be the province 
of state or federal regulation is a topic about which I have written much recently.8  
Although I do myself a disservice by summarizing my own arguments on this 
complex issue in a single sentence, a major theme in my writings has been the 
assertion that exclusive federal regulation of the workplace would be superior to state 
jurisdiction or shared state and federal jurisdiction.  Exclusive federal jurisdiction—
like the other options—is not without costs, but in most cases it is superior to the 
alternatives.  This idea represents a radical departure from our current system in the 
United States; thus, it is no surprise that my arguments have led to stiff opposition 
from those who would prefer to see more, rather than less, state governance of the 
workplace.9  Dill’s article places him firmly in the camp of these opponents.  
Although he is in good company, I remain unmoved by these arguments, particularly 
with regard to attempts to expand nonemployees’ right to access employers’ 
property. 
                                                
5 Property, supra note 1, at 948. 
6 Id. 
7 Dill, supra note 2, at 168-72. 
8 See infra note 16. 
9 See id. 
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I. THE LECHMERE  REALITY 
 A large portion of Dill’s article addresses the same world that I did, one in 
which there is no legislative or judicial response to Lechmere.  Under this regime, the 
Supreme Court has provided employers with near-total power to exclude 
nonemployees from its property, even if those nonemployees were merely trying to 
inform employees of their NLRA right to engage in collective action or seek 
collective representation.10  Given the NLRA’s stagnation over the last several 
decades, this reality is likely to exist for quite some time.11  Indeed, even among the 
few NLRA bills that reached the realm of possibility—yet still failed—an attempt to 
overturn Lechmere has not been among them.12  Similarly, there is no reason to believe 
that the Supreme Court will change its mind in favor of granting unions and other 
nonemployees more access to private property than it did in Lechmere.   
Accordingly, although both Dill and I favor statutory reform, it is important 
to consider other means to address the problems of Lechmere.  This inquiry prompts 
the most significant differences between Dill and myself.  He favors an approach 
that increases the role of states, while my approach would do the opposite by seeking 
to eliminate state law as much as possible from nonemployee right-to-access cases.  
Both proposals have pros and cons, but the passage of time has not dissuaded me 
                                                
10 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee 
Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 24-25), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553031 [hereinafter Communication]. 
11 See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1530-31, 
1543 (2002); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 262, 265-68 (2008) [hereinafter Silicon Bullet]. 
12 See H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1995).  For instance, the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 
1995 (TEAM Act), was passed by a Republican-led Congress and would have lowered restrictions on 
employer-sponsored workplace participation groups.  Id. at § 3 (seeking to amend 29 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(2)).  Congress, however, did not override the veto of President Clinton, a Democrat.  See 142 
CONG. REC. H8816-01 (1996) (announcing veto of President Clinton).  More recently, the Employee 
Free Choice Act of 2009 (EFCA), H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009), would have altered several aspects 
of the certification of unions and the collective negotiations of initial collective-bargaining agreements.  
Id.  Despite high hopes among organized labor groups following the 2008 election, in which 
Democrats gained the White House and both houses of Congress, the EFCA stalled in the Senate, 
and it has little chance of passage.  See Michael O’Brien, Obama: Chances of Passing ‘Card Check’ Now Are 
‘Not Real High,’ THE HILL, Sept. 13, 2010, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/news/118421-obama-chances-of-passing-card-check-now-are-not-real-high. 
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from the view that the enforcement of labor rights would benefit from less state 
involvement, not more. 
A. A Proposal to Eliminate State Property Law from NLRA Access Cases 
 In my article, Taking State Property Rights out of Federal Labor Law, I addressed 
an issue that has troubled many commentators: the harmful effect of Lechmere on 
union organizing.13  Unlike the previous criticisms, however, I began from the 
premise—albeit grudgingly—that Lechmere would not be overturned by either the 
Supreme Court or Congress.14  Instead, I sought an alternative to the NLRB’s 
current application of Lechmere, one that would remain valid under the Supreme 
Court’s precedent, but would reduce its ill effects on union organizing.15  The article 
can also be viewed, with the advantage of hindsight, as an opening salvo in a project 
with which I have been engaged for the last several years.  The aim of this project 
has been to push for more exclusive federal control over labor and employment 
regulation, and it has thankfully grown into a wide-ranging discussion with others.16  
With his current piece, Dill has joined the discussion, and, like most of the 
participants, he is not in my corner. 
                                                
13 See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305, 308 
(1994); Alan L. Zmija, Union Organizing After Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB—A Time to Reexamine the Rule of 
Babcock v. Wilcox, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 65, 99 (1994); Property, supra note 1. 
14 See Property, supra note 1, at 916-17. 
15 Id. at 917-18. 
16 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Revolution in Pragmatist Clothing: Nationalizing Workplace Law, 61 ALA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1329522 [hereinafter Revolution]; Jeffrey M. 
Hirsch, Paper Rights or Real Rights?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 39 (2008); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The 
True Irony of Workplace Law: Less Is More, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 27 (2008); Jeffrey M. 
Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More With Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89 (2008); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, 
Taking States Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 225 (2008).  For opposing views, see, 
e.g., Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act: Unleashing the States in Labor-Management 
Relations Policy, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83 (2009); Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law 
By Reforming Labor Law Preemption Doctrine To Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. 
L. REV. 97 (2009); Paul M. Secunda, Assessing Political Captive Audience Meetings in the Post-Citizens United 
Environment, 120 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 17 (2010); Paul M. Secunda, More of Less: The Limits of 
Minimalism and Self-Regulation, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 33 (2008); Paul M. Secunda, The Ironic 
Necessity for State Protection of Workers, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 21 (2008); Paul M. Secunda, 
Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation To Address Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United 
States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209 (2008). 
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My proposal, at its essence, was to incorporate a typical Section 8(a)(1) 
analysis into nonemployee access cases.17  That is, I argued that the NLRB should 
focus on the question of whether an employer’s attempt to remove nonemployees 
would tend to interfere with reasonable employees’ willingness to exercise their labor 
rights.18  In particular, I would treat peaceful attempts to remove nonemployees from 
property that employees believe is the employer’s—no matter the actual property 
rights—as presumptively lawful.19  This presumption could be rebutted by showing 
special circumstances that would make reasonable employees view the removal as 
coercive, such as a pattern of unlawful anti-union activity or harassment.20  In 
contrast, non-peaceful attempts to remove nonemployees from what employees 
believe to be employer property,21 or peaceful attempts to exclude nonemployees 
from property that employees view as not being the employer’s, would be 
presumptively unlawful.22 
The two major purposes for my proposal were to eliminate the need for the 
NLRB to rule on state property law issues, which are well beyond the agency’s 
expertise, and to focus instead on the effect of exclusions on employees’ labor rights.  
As I argued in my article, the current reliance on state property law has ill-served 
both employees’ labor rights and the NLRB’s ability to adjudicate these disputes.23  
Focusing instead on the manner in which an employer attempts to remove 
nonemployee organizers eliminates the need for the NLRB to analyze state property 
law.  Moreover, where employers remove nonemployee organizers from most 
worksites in a way that tends to chill employees’ willingness to exercise their labor 
                                                
17 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2010).  Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ right to “self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection.”  Id.  Those rights are enforced through Section 8(a)(1), which states that 
“[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in 
the exercise” of their Section 7 rights.  Id. at § 158(a)(1). 
18 Property, supra note 1, at 917-19. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 918-19.  
21 Id. at 919, 925-34.  For example, removal accompanied by threats or violence would be 
presumptively unlawful.  Id.  
22 Id. at 919-20. 
23 See infra pp. 23-25 and notes 51-64 and accompanying text; see also Property, supra note 1, at 909-15.   
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rights, my proposal offers relief that is lacking under current law, as well as under 
Dill’s nonlegislative proposal.  That said, there are still gaps in both of our 
nonlegislative proposals; for that reason, we agree that statutory reform provides the 
best approach for protecting employees’ right to communicate about collective 
action and representation.24 
Dill levels several criticisms at my proposal.  For instance, he argues that the 
Section 8(a)(1) right-to-access analysis would make the NLRB’s job difficult because 
it is subjective.25  That is simply not true.  Like Section 8(a)(1) generally, my proposal 
would center on the objective inquiry of whether the employer’s conduct in 
excluding nonemployees would tend to interfere with a reasonable employee’s labor 
rights.26  Employees’ subjective perceptions could serve as evidence in this objective 
inquiry, but they would not be necessary.27 
 Similarly, Dill is concerned that my proposal would require the NLRB to 
make factual and credibility determinations.28  But this is a criticism that could be 
made of the entire legal system, in which virtually all cases require extensive factual 
determinations.  The NLRB, in particular, is well-versed in fact-finding, as the vast 
majority of its cases turn on disputes over facts and various individuals’ 
interpretations of what happened.  Indeed, if the NLRB is unable to adequately make 
factual findings and credibility determinations, then its entire adjudicatory function is 
in doubt.  But that capability has never been seriously questioned; despite many 
shortcomings with the NLRB, its ability to make factual and credibility 
determinations is not among them.29  Moreover, my proposal would create relatively 
                                                
24 See infra note 73 and accompanying text; Dill, supra note 2, at 170-71. 
25 Dill, supra note 2, at 131, 158.  My test would look to employees’ subjective views of the employer’s 
property right interests.  See Property, supra note 1, at 918.  Dill’s concern is not this element of the test, 
but rather the existence of disputes about each party’s version of the events at the heart of the 
dispute.  Dill, supra note 2, at 158-59. 
26 See Retlaw Broad. Co. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1995).  An employer violates Section 
8(a)(1) when its conduct tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their 
Section 7 rights; evidence of intent is unnecessary.  See id. 
27 Id. 
28 Dill, supra note 2, at 158. 
29 See Fluor Daniel, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.3d 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e severely limit our review 
of credibility determinations and accept those made by the Board unless they have ‘no rational 
basis.’”); Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
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clear guidelines—in the form of rules of presumption—with the intent of aiding the 
NLRB’s analysis of these cases.30  
The irony in this criticism is that Dill’s proposals would do little to lessen the 
NLRB’s fact-finding workload.  In determining whether a state property right to 
exclude exists, as would be required regularly under Dill’s proposals, the NLRB 
would have to address factual questions about where nonemployees were standing, 
what a lease stated, whether the organizers had been given permission to be in an 
area, the extent to which the employer kept out other nonemployee groups, and a 
host of other issues.31 
Dill also expresses concern that my proposal would require separate litigation 
if there were both NLRA and state trespass claims.32  The prospect of parallel state 
and federal litigation is a valid concern, and one that I have addressed before.33  
Unfortunately, this problem cannot be alleviated without a major change in property 
law jurisdiction, as the NLRB is and has always been without power to adjudge state 
trespass claims.34  Thus, Dill’s concern about parallel litigation applies equally to 
                                                                                                                                
L. 707, 754 (2006) (“The Board is thus distinguished from a court not only in its superior ability to 
learn relevant facts.”) (quoting Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board 
and the Court, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 53, 63 (1968)). 
30 See Property, supra note 1, at 918-19. 
31 Dill, supra note 2, at 158-59.  Moreover, Dill argues that his model is superior because it provides an 
objective focus for a fact-finder.  Id.  This argument seems to suggest that property rights questions 
are less susceptible to different factual stories, but reality does not bear that out.  Although there is an 
additional legal component to his analysis—state property law issues that, unlike factual findings, are 
outside of the NLRB’s normal practice—there can be numerous factual questions that the NLRB 
must resolve.  See, e.g., Property, supra note 1, at 893 n.12 (citing cases involving questions about the 
existence of an employer’s right to exclude). 
32 Dill, supra note 2, at 159. 
33 See supra note 16. 
34 One complicated question that may arise in these cases is whether the state trespass claim is 
preempted by the NLRA.  The answer to that question depends on the circumstances, but generally 
Dill’s nonlegislative proposal would result in less preemption—and therefore more two-forum cases—
than my nonlegislative proposal.  See Property, supra note 1, at 936-40.  Any federal legislation 
increasing nonemployees’ right to access would increase the number of preempted state trespass 
claims.  See id. at 938.  Moreover, even under current law, some states specifically exempt from their 
trespass laws any circumstances in which a refusal to leave private property is done in the exercise of a 
federal labor right to be on that property.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 602(o); see also W.VA. CODE § 61-
3B-3 (2005) (exempting labor disputes from criminal trespass liability); Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. 
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current law, as well as the law as it would exist under his proposals.  Simply put, if an 
employer wants to pursue a trespass claim, it will have to instigate separate state 
litigation because the NLRB is wholly without authority to rule on such claims.35  
This is sensible, as state property law should be decided by state courts, while federal 
labor issues should be adjudicated by the NLRB.36  Given the NLRB’s lack of 
jurisdiction over state property claims, not to mention its lack of expertise in the 
area, it makes little sense to force the NLRB to engage in substantive rulings on state 
property law.37 
 One weakness with my original proposal that Dill does not raise, but that has 
become more apparent to me over the years, is that it did not do enough to directly 
recognize the importance of communications to collective activity.  The proposal 
would provide such protection indirectly, but a better solution would provide more 
protection for substantive nonemployee-employee communications.  Such 
interaction is often necessary for employees to have the freedom to exercise their 
right to collective action.38  The problem, ultimately, is that my proposal was only 
intended as a second-best or stopgap measure that reflected the current law.  That 
law, primarily under the Court’s decision in Lechmere, is the real reason that there is 
insufficient protection for workplace communications, because it views virtually any 
type of communication between nonemployees and employees—no matter how 
fleeting—as satisfying employees’ right to learn about collective action.39  That view 
                                                                                                                                
Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 355-56 n.2, 363-64 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing West Virginia, California, 
Hawaii, Louisiana, and New Mexico). 
35 See NLRA §§ 9, 10 (setting forth NLRB’s jurisdiction). 
36 Property, supra note 1, at 942. 
37 Cf. NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the Supreme Court has 
explained “that employers may exclude union organizers in deference to state common law, but not 
because the NLRA itself restricts access.  ‘The right of employers to exclude union organizers from 
their private property emanates from state common law, and while this right is not superseded by the 
NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly protects it.’”) (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 
U.S. 200, 217 n.21 (1994)). 
38 See Communication, supra note 10, at 24-25. 
39 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1992). 
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is demonstrably false,40 and as Dill and I agree, the best solution is to legislatively 
reverse it.41 
B. Back to the Future 
 Although the NLRB has the authority to modify its nonemployee access 
analysis under Lechmere,42 my proposal would admittedly be an abrupt departure from 
a relatively established practice.  It is no surprise, therefore, that others may seek less 
radical departures from the status quo.  Dill’s nonlegislative proposal, however, 
suffers from the opposite problem, as its main requirement would do no more than 
require the NLRB to follow its current practice.43 
 The central argument in Dill’s proposal is that the NLRB’s Lechmere analysis 
should begin with a determination whether an employer has a state property right to 
exclude.44  This reform is anything but, as it merely describes the current state of 
NLRB law. 
 Dill acknowledges that in many cases the NLRB already examines employer’s 
state property interests as an initial matter.45  Yet, he decries what he characterizes as 
an alternative Lechmere analysis, one in which the threshold question is solely whether 
the two Babcock exceptions—no other means of access, and discrimination—apply.46  
This alternative analysis is an illusion, however; in truth the NLRB and courts have 
never abandoned the rule that Lechmere only applies where the employer has a state 
property right to exclude.47  For instance, the D.C. Circuit has explicitly stated that 
                                                
40 See Communication, supra note 10, at 25. 
41 See infra pp. 29-33 and notes 73-79 and accompanying text. 
42 As I argued in my article, the reliance on state property law seems to ignore the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Lechmere that nonemployees’ derivative right to communicate with employees is satisfied as 
long as the nonemployees have a means to access employees.  Property, supra note 1, at 907.  In other 
words, as long as the easy-to-satisfy alternative access concern is met, nonemployees’ derivative rights 
are no longer in play. 
43 See Dill, supra note 2, at 131. 
44 Id. at 168. 
45 Id. at 150-51 (citing NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
46 Id. at 150. 
47 See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 540 F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir. 2008); NLRB v. Calkins, 
187 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Where state law does not create [an interest allowing the 
employer to exclude organizers], access may not be restricted consistent with Section 8(a)(1).”); 
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under the NLRB’s reading of Lechmere, an “employer may, without violating § 8(a)(1), 
exclude a nonemployee union representative from its property if and only if it has that 
right under state law.”48 
As the sole example of the alternative analysis, Dill cites a Second Circuit 
decision issued subsequent to my article, Salmon Run Shopping Center LLC v. NLRB.49  
It is true that the court in Salmon Run focused solely on whether one of the Babcock 
exceptions applied.50  But it goes too far to suggest that the court was holding that 
state property law is never an issue in nonemployee access cases.  Instead, Salmon 
Run is merely one of many cases—like, as Dill notes, Lechmere itself—in which the 
employer’s state property right to exclude is uncontested.51  Indeed, the court in 
Salmon Run noted that the only contested issue was whether the union’s invocation 
of the discrimination exception was appropriate.52  Given that no party questioned 
the employer’s right to exclude, it is little wonder that the court and the NLRB did 
not waste time in addressing that issue.53   
More generally, Dill cites no cases—and I am aware of none—in which the 
NLRB has applied Lechmere in a situation in which it found that the employer lacked 
a right to exclude.54  To the contrary, the NLRB, with court approval, has repeatedly 
                                                                                                                                
O’Neil’s Mkts. v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 733, 738–39 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Johnson & Hardin Co., 305 
N.L.R.B. 690 (1991), enforced in relevant part, 49 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “Lechmere leaves 
undisturbed previous Board holdings that an employer lacking the right to exclude others from certain 
property violates section 8(a)(1) when it removes section 7 actors from those areas”)); Corp. Interiors, 
Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. 732, 745–49 (2003); Snyder’s of Hanover, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 183, 185 (2001), 
enforcement denied on other grounds, 39 F. App’x 730, 734 (3d Cir. 2002); Bristol Farms, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 
437, 438 (1993). 
48 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 451 F.3d 241, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). 
49 Salmon Run Shopping Ctr., LLC v. NLRB, 534 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2008). 
50 Id. at 114. 
51 Dill, supra note 2, at 150.  Dill also appropriately acknowledges the Court’s reliance on state 
property rights when determining unions’ access rights, as stated in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 
510 U.S. 200, 217 (1994).  Id. at 152. 
52 Salmon Run, 534 F. 3d at 114 (noting that it was reviewing a NLRB order that “rested exclusively 
upon a claim of discrimination”). 
53 See id. at 108. 
54 See, e.g., CSX Hotels, Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.3d 394, 400–01 (4th Cir. 2004); Victory Mkts., Inc., 322 
N.L.R.B. 17, 20–21 (1996).  Among the few times an employer will be justified in removing 
nonemployees from property over which it has no right to exclude are instances where the 
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reasserted its long-held view that under Lechmere, it is “beyond question” that an 
employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it attempts to bar nonemployee collective 
activity from property over which it lacks a state right to exclude.55 
Dills’ state property law proposal, therefore, is a solution looking for a 
problem.  More accurately, it is a proposal that would reestablish the current 
problems with the NLRB’s Lechmere analysis—a status quo that both Dill and I agree 
fails to adequately protect communications between nonemployees and employees.56  
Thus, the question is what to do about this failure.  Although largely a restatement of 
current NLRB law, Dill’s proposal and its defense of the incorporation of state 
property law into the Lechmere analysis raises a more general policy debate regarding 
the value of shared state and federal governance over labor law. 
C. Labor Federalism 
 Dill’s argument in favor of increased state labor regulation joins a larger 
debate about workplace federalism.  I have written much on this topic and will not 
rehash here the arguments for and against state regulation of the workplace.57  
However, it is worth emphasizing that there are costs and benefits to each argument.  
For example, as Dill implicitly recognizes, it would be desirable to have a uniform 
standard for the NLRB’s analysis of nonemployee access disputes—a standard that 
becomes more difficult with increased state law influence.  On the other hand, if one 
is concerned about increasing protection for nonemployee access, state regulation 
provides an additional option, albeit one that would likely be as difficult to achieve as 
more direct reform of federal labor law. 
Of more importance is the central point that I have tried to make throughout 
this debate, which is that we need to move away from judging workplace federalism 
based on its ability to provide a specific outcome at a given point in time.58  This is 
the approach that Dill and other critics have adopted.  In contrast, I have argued that 
we should instead focus on placing jurisdiction with the entity or entities in the best 
                                                                                                                                
nonemployees, for example, are blocking access to the employer’s business or causing traffic 
problems.  Id.  However, these cases were not decided under the Lechmere analysis.  Id. 
55 Bristol Farms, 311 N.L.R.B. at 437–38; see also supra note 47. 
56 Dill, supra note 2, at 130-31. 
57 See Revolution, supra note 16. 
58 See id. 
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position to exercise it.  Such a policy is most likely to provide superior regulation 
over the long term.59 
 The danger of an outcome determinative approach is two-fold.  First, it is 
futile to attempt to develop a federalism approach that will consistently produce a 
desired outcome.  Political winds change rapidly, and there is no better example of 
this phenomenon than labor law.  The policy oscillations of the NLRB are well 
known and make any attempt to predict what the NLRB will do in the future 
impossible.60  Similar changes often occur in states as well.  Therefore, expanding 
state labor jurisdiction may provide employees more protection in the near term—at 
least employees in a select few states61—but such an expansion may end up 
undermining stronger federal enforcement in the future.62 
 Second, an outcome determinative approach is unprincipled and ignores 
important questions of governing competence.  It seems far better in the long run to 
place jurisdiction with the entity that is best able to achieve labor law’s goals.  The 
national and international nature of the global labor market suggests that consistent 
national regulation will generally be the most efficient form of labor governance.63  
This is particularly true when considering the NLRB’s use of specific topics like 
property law, where there are significant disparities among the states.64  To be sure, 
federal enforcement is far from perfect, but we are likely to see better regulation over 
                                                
59 See id. 
60 See Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199, 
231 (2010).  See generally Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 
ADMIN. L. REV. 163 (1985). 
61 Cutting out state law admittedly has its costs, especially in the few states with more union-friendly 
property law—although employees in states with less friendly laws would do worse under Dill’s 
proposal.  Moreover, it is possible that a “ratchet” approach, in which the federal government sets a 
minimum level of regulation which states can add to, will result in an optimal mix of rights.  See John 
O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. 
L. REV. 485, 520 (2002).  However, the ratchet approach would also result in additional costs from 
increased complexity.  See Revolution, supra note 16, at 62. 
62 See Revolution, supra note 16, at 61, 63. 
63 See id. at 3, 4, 40-43 (describing the costs of state workplace regulation in a national and 
international labor market). 
64 See Waremart Foods v. NLRB, 354 F.3d 870, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Snyder’s of Hanover, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 39 F. App’x 730, 734 (3d Cir. 2002); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374–75 (N.J. 1971).  
2010]        A STATE OR FEDERAL SOLUTION?                   187 
the long term from centralized federal labor governance than decentralized state 
governance—especially given states’ relative inexperience with labor law.65 
 The other side of this coin is that there are risks in giving the NLRB more 
jurisdiction than is warranted.  The NLRB’s expertise is federal labor law; forcing it 
to delve deeply into other complicated areas of law, like state property law, is 
demanding too much of a specialized administrative agency.  As I noted in my 
article, the NLRB has struggled to make sense of complex property law issues, which 
is not a surprise given its expertise in federal labor law.66  Indeed, the risks associated 
with expanding the NLRB’s reliance on state property law was recently underscored 
in its Register-Guard decision, which addressed employer limits on electronic 
communications.67 
 Dill appropriately criticizes Register-Guard’s substantial narrowing of the 
Babcock discrimination exception.68  However, another aspect of the decision is worth 
noting.  In Register-Guard, the NLRB created a new rule for employer attempts to bar 
use of its electronic systems and other personal property.  In so doing, the NLRB 
ran afoul of a basic rule of property law that should be obvious to most first-year law 
students.  The problem comes from the fact that, in contrast to nonemployee access 
cases, the NLRB has long given employees a presumptive right to solicit for 
                                                
65 Although there are exceptions, such as New York’s Public Employment Relations Board, most 
states’ labor law regulation is far more limited than the NLRB’s, and some states lack any traditional 
labor laws. 
66 Property, supra note 1, at 909-15. 
67 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), enforced in part, enforcement denied in 
part; Register-Guard v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (refusing enforcement in part but not 
addressing the substance of the NLRB’s new rules on electronic communications or discriminatory 
applications of non-solicitation policies). 
68 Dill, supra note 2, at 153-55.  I share Dill’s concern about the expansion of Register-Guard’s definition 
of discrimination to real property cases.  Id. at 153 (citing Fremont-Rideout Health Group, 20-CA-
33521, 2009 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 20, at *32-34 (Jan. 29, 2009)).  That said, there was no reason to think 
that the NLRB would do otherwise, as Register-Guard relied explicitly on the Seventh Circuit’s 
definition of discrimination in real property access cases.  Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1117-18 
(citing Fleming Cos. v. NLRB, 349 F.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2003); Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 
F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1995)).  However, the Obama NLRB has just announced that it is 
reconsidering Register-Guard’s narrow interpretation of discrimination.  See National Labor Relations 
Board, Notice and Invitation to File Briefs (Nov. 17, 2010) (seeking briefs in Roundy’s Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. 
No. 27 (2010), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/news_room/Invitations/Documents/ 
Roundy's%20Notice%20and%20Invitation.pdf. 
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collective action on employers’ property during nonwork time and in nonwork 
areas.69  Yet the NLRB refused to extend that presumption to employee emails in 
Register-Guard, concluding that employers have a greater interest over their personal 
property.70  This directly conflicts with a basic property law rule:  real property is 
entitled to more protection, not less, than personal property.71  If the NLRB cannot 
grasp such a basic rule of property law, why would we want to expand its reach into 
often far more complex state property issues implicated by nonemployee access 
cases? 
II. WISHFUL THINKING:  THE LABOR RIGHTS ACT 
 One significant point upon which Dill and I agree is the need for legislation 
to better protect the ability of nonemployees and employees to communicate at the 
worksite.  My earlier proposal was limited to a world in which Lechmere remained 
valid and, as such, was admittedly an attempt at a second-best solution.72  Ideally, 
legislative reform would make my proposal unnecessary. 
 Dill’s proposed legislative response is his “Labor Rights Act” (LRA), which 
would guarantee that all individuals, including nonemployees, have a right to use an 
employer’s public accommodations free from discrimination based on labor 
viewpoints.73  Although possibly an improvement on the status quo, the proposal 
does not go far enough.  Indeed, a fair reading of the LRA’s terms would actually 
provide less protection for certain nonemployee communications than exists under 
current law. 
 First, the proposed LRA seems to narrow protection for nonemployees in 
                                                
69 See LeTourneau Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1260 (1944), rev’d sub nom.  Republic Aviation Corp. v. 
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); see also TeleTech Holdings, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 402, 403 (2001) (“A no-
distribution rule which is not restricted to working time and to work areas is overly broad and 
presumptively unlawful.”).  Exceptions to this presumption exist for production or disciplinary 
reasons, or where written distributions are involved.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 
U.S. 105, 110 (1956) (citing LeTourneau, 54 N.L.R.B. at 1262); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 
843-44 (1943). 
70 Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1117. 
71 See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 302-03 (Cal. 2003).  Personal property is a form of chattel, 
and a trespass of chattel claim, unlike real property trespass, requires proof of harm.  See id. 
72 Property, supra note 1, at 908 n.105. 
73 Dill, supra note 2, at 170. 
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many situations.  By limiting its application to areas of public accommodation, there 
is an implication that attempts to access non-public employer property are wholly 
without protection—a significant problem given that many employers provide no 
public access to their worksites.   
Second, even if the LRA is intended as an additional protection for public 
workplaces that would exist along with the Lechmere framework, it is still questionable 
whether it would do much to advance nonemployees’ ability to communicate on 
employer property.  This is because the LRA, on its face, does not provide any more 
protection than current law.  Even under Lechmere, employers cannot bar 
nonemployee solicitations in a discriminatory fashion.  The question, of course, is 
how to define “discrimination.”  Dill’s proposal does not clarify the term, thereby 
leaving it in the first instance to the NLRB.  There is generally nothing wrong with 
leaving such interpretations to the NLRB; however, this failure to provide a more 
specific definition would do nothing to address the problems with the NLRB’s 
interpretation of discrimination under Register-Guard.74  Both Dill and I agree that this 
definition is unjustifiably narrow, thus the LRA proposal would benefit from a 
clearer and broader interpretation of discrimination. 
 More important, legislative reform of nonemployee access should not be 
restricted to situations that involve discriminatory bars to access.  The importance of 
communications between nonemployees and employees exists no matter the 
employer’s motivation in trying to stop such communications.75  Accordingly, true 
reform would seek to ensure some level of nonemployee access in most instances, 
balanced against employers’ property and business interests.   
One need not look far for this reform, as an appropriate standard has existed 
for 75 years: the Republic Aviation rule.76  Although the rule has been limited to 
                                                
74 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
75 See supra note 61; Communication, supra note 10. 
76 See supra note 70.  Professor Cynthia Estlund has proposed a similar test, which would replace 
Lechmere with a rule that would require that an employer provide a “good reason” before excluding 
nonemployees who are trying to communicate peacefully with individuals who are typically allowed in 
a given area.  Estlund, supra note 11, at 344.  One difference between our approaches is that Estlund’s 
test would apply only where employers had a state law right to exclude, while my proposal could apply 
even if the employer lacked that right.  See Property, supra note 1, at 942-43 (contrasting my Lechmere 
proposal with Estlund’s proposal).  That said, in practice both approaches would be similar—in most 
cases employers would have to provide some reasonable level of access to nonemployees. 
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employee communications, there is no reason why a modified version cannot apply 
to nonemployees as well.  For instance, the new rule could create a presumption that 
employers must allow nonemployees some access to a worksite for the purposes of 
communicating with employees.  Employers would have the opportunity to rebut 
that presumption, such as by showing that the requested access would be unduly 
disruptive or that special business concerns necessitated unusual limits on access.  
The result would likely be a NLRB-developed norm that would generally permit 
unions and other nonemployees some degree of access to employer property in areas 
and during times in which employees arrive and leave.77  Consequently, the rule 
would substantially expand nonemployees’ ability to communicate with employees, 
including at worksites that do not generally allow public access.78  
III. CONCLUSION 
 Nonemployees’ ability to access a worksite to communicate with employees 
is a significant issue in labor law.79  Such communications are often a prerequisite to 
the core right of the NLRA: the ability of employees to choose whether to engage in 
collective action.80  As Dill and I agree, the status quo following Lechmere falls 
woefully short of providing the access needed for employees to truly enjoy this right.  
How to address that shortcoming is where we differ. 
 Despite opposition from Dill and others, I remain convinced that expanding 
states’ role in enforcing labor law is the wrong approach.  Although certain states 
would expand access, many others would not, and the overall effect would be to 
further complicate an already complex analysis.  A better solution would be to reduce 
                                                
77 In establishing these norms, the NLRB would consider many factors, including the degree of public 
access to the area in question, the effect on the employer’s business, and the effectiveness of the 
access in fostering nonemployee/employee communications.  Cf. Silicon Bullet, supra note 11, at 287-
88, 294 (discussing similar proposal for electronic communications). 
78 See supra note 77.  However, the lack of public access could be a factor in the degree of require 
access.  Id. 
79 Dill notes that in one of the fiscal years that I surveyed, there was only one Lechmere NLRB 
decision. Dill, supra note 2, at 169.  While it is true that the NLRB does not issue numerous Lechmere 
decisions—although only a single case in a given year is an outlier—that does not minimize the 
negative effect of Lechmere.  Because of the substantial limitations that Lechmere places on nonemployee 
communications, its biggest effect perhaps is chilling nonemployees’ attempts to access employer 
property. 
80 Communication, supra note 10. 
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the reliance on state law, whether through my proposed rule or—even better—
federal legislation that overturned Lechmere.  This legislation, however, must provide 
broad access, including access to property that is not typically accessible to the 
public.  It is only by giving employees at virtually all worksites the opportunity to 
communicate with nonemployees that the right to collective action will have any 
relevance for most employees.   

